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ExECUTIVE SUmmARy
This Working Paper describes and critically reviews the 
recent emergence of agricultural growth corridors and 
other types of corridor with a prominent agricultural 
component. It offers a descriptive overview and poses 
some political economy questions. It focuses on four 
projects on the eastern seaboard of Africa: the Southern 
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT); 
the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor (BAGC); the 
Nacala development corridor in Mozambique; and the 
Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) 
Corridor based in Kenya. It identifies three major 
influences on the current popularity of corridors: the 
evolution of logistics corridors into tools of development 
policy; new thinking among donors on infrastructure, 
agriculture and the role of private sector development; 
and the needs of private sector actors for investment to 
support production and secure their supply chains in a 
globalised world. 
The paper notes some key differences between the 
four corridors, which include that agriculture was more 
central to the original design of SAGCOT and BAGC 
than the Nacala and LAPSSET corridors. It also notes 
some similarities, such as the observation that all 
four aim to use infrastructure to leverage investment 
in agriculture and support commercially oriented 
producers to supply globalised markets. It finds that 
the primary drivers of corridor developments are not 
usually domestic governments but rather coalitions 
of private sector actors who have been able to align 
their commercial ambitions with mainstream ideas on 
infrastructure and agriculture among donors and the 
international development community. 
Some actors are involved in more than one of the 
corridor developments. However, the way that public 
and private interests interact with each other and 
with local stakeholders is specific to each project, 
and specific narratives have been used to legitimise 
the corridors in each context. This has led to some 
unexpected ruptures in relationships between project 
partners and spaces for resistance, especially with 
Nacala and LAPSSET. While project outcomes are just 
beginning to be documented, the paper raises some 
preliminary concerns over infringement of land rights, 
exclusion of some farmers and herders, and failure to 
articulate how corridors will address the causes of low 
productivity, poverty and food insecurity in rural areas.
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INTRODUCTION
Many current policies and programmes for agricultural 
development in Africa include components that have a 
distinctly spatial character: ideas of agri-clusters and 
business hubs, of long-distance supply chains and 
value chains, of rural–urban linkages and of physical 
infrastructure projects. One of the ways in which 
these ideas are being packaged and delivered is the 
agricultural growth corridor – a new spin on economic 
development corridors that has gained popularity 
in recent years (Kaarhus 2011). Combining physical 
infrastructure along transport and communication 
routes with place-based investment in agriculture and 
other sectors, corridor projects from Namibia to Nigeria 
have received new life during the past decade. 
This working paper describes and critically reviews the 
recent emergence of agricultural growth corridors and 
other types of corridor with a prominent agricultural 
component. The paper focuses on four corridor 
projects on the eastern seaboard of Africa: the Southern 
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT); the 
Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor (BAGC); the Nacala 
development corridor, incorporating the ProSAVANA 
programme1 and Project for Nacala Corridor Economic 
Development Strategies (also known as the Nacala 
Logistics Corridor); and Lamu Port-South Sudan-
Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor. While each 
corridor may link two or more countries, this paper 
concentrates on the countries where the destination 
port is located and where the majority of activity has 
occurred, namely: Tanzania (for SAGCOT), Mozambique 
(Beira and Nacala) and Kenya (LAPSSET).
The ultimate interest of this research is in how these 
corridors are reshaping agricultural commercialisation 
pathways and rural livelihoods in marginal, frontier 
areas, with what impacts for whom. Concerned with 
the political economy of agricultural growth corridors, 
the following questions were used to guide the study:
•	 What	are	the	drivers	of	corridor	development	
in	east	Africa?
•	 Who	are	the	main	interest	groups	and	what	are	
the	political	dynamics	between	them	which	
are	affecting	how	the	corridor	projects	have	
unfolded	so	far?	
•	 What	opportunities	for	accumulation	exist	
from	the	corridor	developments,	for	whom,	
and	who	loses	out?	What	patterns	of	elite	
capture,	patronage	and	social	differentiation	
are	emerging,	with	what	consequences?
•	 What	models	of	agricultural	and	rural	
development	are	being	promoted	by	the	
corridor	proponents?
•	 What	are	the	likely	impacts	and	influences	
of	the	corridor	developments	on	women,	on	
small	businesses	and	on	poor	farmers	and	
pastoralists?
The sections that follow highlight some key differences 
between the four corridors, which include that agriculture 
was more central to the original design of SAGCOT and 
BAGC than the Nacala and LAPSSET corridors. They 
also note some similarities, such as the observation that 
all four aim to use infrastructure to leverage investment 
in agriculture and support commercially oriented 
producers to supply globalised markets. The paper 
finds that the primary drivers of corridor developments 
are not usually domestic governments but rather 
coalitions of private sector actors who have been able 
to align their commercial ambitions with mainstream 
ideas on infrastructure and agriculture among donors 
and the international development community. Some 
actors are involved in more than one of the corridor 
developments. However, the way that public and 
private interests interact with each other and with local 
stakeholders is specific to each project, and specific 
narratives have been used to legitimise the corridors 
in each context. This has led to some unexpected 
ruptures in relationships between project partners 
and spaces for resistance, especially with Nacala and 
LAPSSET. While project outcomes are just beginning 
to be documented, this paper raises some preliminary 
concerns over land rights infringements, exclusion of 
certain farmers and herders, and a lack of attention by 
corridor proponents to the causes of low productivity, 
poverty and food insecurity in rural areas.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides 
a definition of corridors from a mainstream economics 
perspective. Section 3 explores the history of corridors 
to understand why they are popular now and where 
1.
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they came from. A descriptive overview of the four 
eastern seaboard corridors is provided in Section 4. 
Section 5 identifies the main actors involved and 
assesses how they have influenced progress to date. 
Finally, Section 6 returns to the research questions and 
presents some observations from a critical political-
economic perspective and raises some new questions 
for future study. 
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DEFINITIONS
Much of the work to date on development corridors 
is found in mainstream economics literature. The 
literature provides definitions and a framing that tend to 
emphasise the business and macroeconomic functions 
of corridors over their political-economic aspects. This 
section presents a classification of corridors drawn from 
that predominantly economic perspective.
2.1 Defining corridors and other   
 spatial development initiatives
A corridor, in this context, is a geographical area of 
a country or group of countries surrounding a major 
transport route such as a highway or railway, which 
supports economic activity at the ends of, and along, 
the route. Often, the corridor route connects sources 
of natural materials in the hinterland to ports, markets 
and labour at the coast, and there may be oil pipelines, 
telephone lines or fibre-optic cables running along the 
route. 
A corridor is more than simply the transport route itself; 
the term signals either the concentrated presence of 
economic activity that is related to the route, or an 
explicit policy initiative that takes advantage of the 
transport infrastructure. In a generalised form, corridors 
are linear, but they can expand into sub-branches and 
networks (Gálvez Nogales 2014).
Corridors often change over time. The mainstream 
economics literature presents this as an evolution in 
the complexity and scope of corridor projects and of 
their underlying economic and development policy 
objectives, as illustrated in Figure 1 (see also Hope and 
Cox 2015). Viewed within this evolutionary framing, the 
simplest corridors are transport or transit corridors, 
which comprise  transport infrastructure and associated 
services. To this can be added: further investment in hard 
and soft infrastructure; measures to support business, 
customs and trade; development programmes for 
economic sectors present in the corridor areas; and 
social initiatives in health, poverty reduction and so on. 
These more sophisticated forms are known as logistics 
corridors, trade corridors, economic corridors and 
growth or development corridors, depending on 
their scope. Although the most sophisticated kind 
(development corridors) may be planned from scratch, 
they typically evolve from existing rail or road routes.
Corridors are a kind of spatial development initiative 
(SDI). Other SDIs include special economic zones 
(SEZs) and development clusters, which themselves 
may be included as components of economic or 
development corridors. Some forms of SDI are explicitly 
designed to support agriculture and agribusiness in rural 
production areas and/or in urban or coastal processing 
zones. The most common agricultural SDIs established 
in rural areas are corridors and clusters.
Figure 1: Types of corridor and the evolutionary path they may take
2.
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2.2  The premise of agricultural   
 growth corridors
This paper is most interested in the sophisticated types 
of corridor known as growth or development corridors, 
and particularly in the specialist form of ‘agricultural 
growth corridors’, which is a term that has been used 
to describe three of the four eastern seaboard corridors 
under study. Agricultural growth corridors are based 
on the premise that transport infrastructure can be 
leveraged to support farming and attract agribusiness 
investment. The leverage effect is explained in the 
following definitions from the literature (emphasis 
added):
Resource corridor: A sequence of investments 
and actions to leverage a large extractive industry 
investment in infrastructure, goods and services, 
into sustainable, inclusive economic development 
and diversification along a specific geographic 
area. (Adam Smith International 2015: 10)
Infrastructure corridor: Coordinated investment in 
an infrastructure system to jumpstart and facilitate 
rural markets and reduce logistical inefficiencies. 
(World Economic Forum 2010: 19)
The economic corridor approach looks at 
regional transport routes not only as a means of 
transporting goods and services or as a gateway 
for land-locked countries, but also as a tool for 
stimulating social and economic development in 
the areas surrounding the route. (Mulenga 2013: 
2)
The coordination and mobilisation of investment that is 
needed to achieve such wider-reaching development 
outcomes implies a substantial role for public finance 
and government, and as such, corridors operate as 
public–private partnerships, as explained by Byiers and 
colleagues: 
The corridors approach aims to promote 
spatially targeted, coordinated public and private 
investment with focused policy reforms and 
public finance, clustering of investments, logistics 
and market integration both within and between 
national markets, often formed with links to, or 
building on, SDIs. (Byiers, Bizzotto Molina and 
Engel 2016: 6)
The next section explores the kinds of agricultural 
growth corridor that have developed in Africa and 
broadens the analysis from predominantly economic 
classifications to a more critical consideration of their 
origins.
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INFLUENCES ON THE
DEVELOpmENT OF AGRICULTURAL
GROWTH CORRIDORS IN AFRICA
3.1  Introduction: the current   
 status of corridors and other   
 agricultural SDIs in Africa
Spatial development initiatives have been less common 
in sub-Saharan Africa, and less well studied, than 
in other regions of the world. There are relatively few 
African corridors of any type, and when it comes to 
agricultural growth or development corridors only 
four could be identified: SAGCOT in Tanzania, Beira 
and Nacala in Mozambique, and LAgos-KAno-JIbiya 
(LAKAJI) in Nigeria. All have been conceived within 
the past ten years or so. In addition, there are several 
economic corridors in sub-Saharan Africa which have an 
agricultural component, such as LAPSSET, the Maputo 
Development Corridor and the Walvis Bay group of 
corridors in southern and central Africa. More common 
in Africa are agricultural clusters, which are also SDIs 
and depend on infrastructure just like corridors but lack 
the linear aspect. They are also not so closely linked 
to transport routes and existing industries which use 
them, such as mining.
Using the economic definitions introduced in Section 2, 
one can summarise that Africa has three types of SDI 
with an agricultural component: 
1. Agricultural growth corridors, where agriculture 
is central to the design and planning of the 
initiative – i.e. ‘the whole... programme revolves 
around agricultural and agribusiness development 
concentrated around a major infrastructure 
investment or set of interrelated infrastructure 
projects’ (Gálvez Nogales 2014: 12).
2. More general economic or development 
corridors where, in a secondary phase, planners 
aim to add components for supporting agriculture 
(and potentially other economic sectors in the 
corridor areas) through a process sometimes 
referred to as ‘densification’ (Mtegha et al. 2012).
3. Agricultural clusters, defined by Gálvez Nogales 
as ‘a concentration of producers and institutions 
that are engaged in the food and agricultural 
sector and that inter-connect and build value 
networks, either formally or informally, when 
addressing common challenges and pursing 
common opportunities’ (2010: 5).
According to the evolutionary nature of corridors posited 
by authors such as Gálvez Nogales, one might expect 
the second type of initiative listed above to become more 
common over time. Owing to the historical work of the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and 
South Africa’s Spatial Development Initiative, corridors 
have been most common in southern Africa, as will be 
explained in Section 3.2. But, in the context of intra-
regional initiatives such as the Abuja Process, there 
are also an increasing number of corridors, particularly 
transport corridors, in West Africa (Mtegha et al. 2012; 
Government of Denmark 2014; Byiers et al. 2016).
A list of the African corridors identified in the literature 
is given in the Annexe, and 33 of them are shown in 
Figure 2 below.
3.
Figure 2: Development corridors in 
sub-Saharan Africa as of 2013 
Source: Reprinted from Global Food Security 2.3, Weng et al., Mineral 
Industries, Growth Corridors and Agricultural Development in Africa, 2013, 
with kind permission from Elsevier.
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The rest of this section identifies three main roots of the 
current forms of development corridors in Africa with an 
agricultural component: (1) previous spatial models and 
efforts in southern Africa to transform older transport 
corridors into development corridors; (2) trends in 
development thinking; and (3) the changing needs of 
private sector investors. 
3.2  The emergence of corridors as   
 development policy tools
Agricultural development corridor projects that exist 
today are located in historical transport corridors 
which served, notably during colonial times, to 
exert territorialism and facilitate the flow of exports, 
imports and labour in core–periphery relationships. 
This included multiple routes in southern Africa which 
connected mining towns with manufacturing centres, 
coastal ports and labour reserves (Maennling, Shah and 
Thomashausen 2014). 
During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, political events 
influenced the development of transport corridors 
in southern Africa, with events such as Rhodesia’s 
independence and political unrest in Angola and 
Mozambique leading to some routes becoming 
blocked and the need to develop or rehabilitate new 
routes and ports. While it is often rightly stressed 
that the corridors were important copper and coal 
transport routes, they were also used for transporting 
agricultural produce for export, such as sugar, tobacco 
and citrus, and agricultural interests were consulted on 
corridors’ future development. A plan for rehabilitation 
of the Zimbabwe–Mozambique Beira corridor in 1986, 
for example, included agricultural and cattle ranching 
projects (Fair 1989).
In the 1990s, South African President Nelson Mandela 
realised that transport corridors could be used for the 
goals of sustainable development. He saw that the 
infrastructure needed by the mining industry in southern 
Africa was a kind of positive externality that could be 
harnessed to development strategies to revitalise 
regions of South Africa that had been marginalised 
under apartheid. In 1994, South Africa’s Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) established an SDI with 
the aim of using infrastructure funded by public money 
and private mining concessions to serve the needs of 
farmers and other businesses and to attract additional 
investors into targeted areas. In a prototype of the 
‘clusters’ discussed in today’s corridor developments, 
the DTI used the concept of ‘densification’ to promote 
geographically consolidated business (Taylor 2000; 
Kuhlmann, Sechler and Guinan 2011). 
The development corridors strategy was taken on by 
the African Union through its technical agency NEPAD. 
Kuhlmann and colleagues (2011: 8) wrote that NEPAD 
officials believed corridors had the transformative 
potential to support indigenous economic development. 
However, they argued that the strategy did not achieve 
traction for sustained rural development because at 
that time (the 1990s) there was not enough attention 
paid to other activities needed to support agriculture, 
apart from infrastructure, and investors and donors 
themselves were still not prioritising agriculture. One 
example is the Maputo Development Corridor in 
Mozambique, launched in 1996, which used public–
private financing to improve railways, highways and the 
port at Maputo, but also involved regulatory changes to 
facilitate cross-border trade. A critical review found that 
the Maputo corridor lacked involvement of government 
and communities in its planning and execution, which 
led to limited scope for benefits to extend beyond the 
investing companies themselves and to a series of 
unintended side-effects. A member of the South African 
Commission on Gender Equality remarked, ‘Sadly, the 
only industry that appears to be working for women is 
sex work that has sprung up along the highway, which 
is unfortunately accompanied by the increase in HIV 
and AIDS’ (cited in Taylor 2000: 14).
Nevertheless, within NEPAD and other agencies, 
development corridors have remained a popular, 
recurring model for regional and rural development 
programmes in Africa, and the links between the mining 
sector, agriculture and infrastructure have continued to 
be explored, partly because of reasons discussed in 
Section 3.3 below (Thomas 2009).
Another model from which the planners of today’s 
corridors have learned is economic zones such as 
export processing zones (EPZs), freeports and SEZs. 
Implemented in various forms around the world from 
the 1950s onwards, these zones were attempts to 
attract investment and create jobs, often by offering 
export-oriented companies a chance to operate at zero 
or minimal tax rates in countries with low labour costs 
(Baissac 2011; Farole and Akinci 2011). Economic 
zones are of interest to development corridors as they 
were similar experiments in ways to create enabling 
conditions for the private sector in order to generate 
local social and economic benefits – and obviously 
they were also, like corridors, SDIs with infrastructural 
components. However, similar to the southern African 
development corridors, linkages from SEZs to the 
wider economy appear to have been limited, except for 
some striking success stories in China. African SEZs 
are widely viewed to have been a disappointment – 
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although it is notable that the types of business that 
operated within them tended to provide more jobs for 
women than most business arrangements (Farole and 
Akinci 2011). Lessons that could perhaps be learned 
for current development corridor initiatives are that 
African SEZs suffered from weak governance, lack of 
good planning and management, and high transport 
and transaction costs (Farole 2011).
3.3  Trends in development    
 thinking on agriculture and   
 infrastructure
Corridors are public–private partnerships which receive 
substantial aid and state finance. This section identifies 
some key priorities and ideas among the international 
development community that have encouraged their 
recent support of corridor projects. 
3.3.1 Market barriers and infrastructure
There is a wide-ranging concern among development 
banks, donors, development agencies, academics 
and other actors about market barriers or constraints 
(see, for example, Kuhlmann et al. 2011). In agriculture, 
this could refer to barriers impeding farmers’ access 
to markets and services (Weng et al. 2013); but 
organisations are concerned about market constraints 
more generally in terms of how they are impeding 
sectoral development, regional trade and economic 
growth in developing countries (see, for example, 
NEPAD 2016 on the MoveAfrica initiative). One priority 
is to help insecure land-locked countries gain access to 
markets (Nicol 2015). This phenomenon may be linked 
to the influence of new institutional economics in recent 
years – a discipline of economics which addresses 
impediments to perfectly functioning markets – and 
also reflects the shift in emphasis from aid to economic 
growth in development circles (Taylor 2000).
We see this concern about market constraints in the 
renewed enthusiasm among development banks 
and other funding organisations to support projects 
to improve infrastructure in a country or sub-region 
(Nissanke and Söderberg 2011: 23; see Table 1 below). 
This support may be enabling national governments 
to channel more public finance into infrastructure (e.g. 
see Birch and Lind 2014 for Ethiopia and Kenya). An 
example is the African Development Bank (AfDB)’s 
Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 
(PIDA), launched in 2010 with NEPAD and the African 
Union Commission. The programme explicitly links 
poverty reduction and socioeconomic development to 
improved access to infrastructure networks and services 
(AfDB 2016). Among bilateral donors, an important 
actor is the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), which makes a financial contribution to PIDA. 
JICA has historically promoted African infrastructure 
more strongly than its peers and, in 2008, agreed an 
increase in aid to Africa, which included a US$4bn 
facility for hard and soft infrastructure and agriculture 
projects (Cornelissen 2016). 
In the agricultural sphere, lenders now identify 
infrastructure as a crucial requirement for agricultural 
development after a long period of underinvestment. 
From 2003 to 2005, only 3 percent of World Bank 
Private Participation in Infrastructure projects was for 
infrastructure intended to raise agricultural productivity, 
and alternative private or public–private sources of 
project finance did not materialise in sufficient quantities 
(Warner, Kahan and Lehel 2008). 
The development community reflects that leaving the 
private sector to invest in rural infrastructure during the 
1980s and 1990s has seriously backfired, and transport 
and road corridors are now once again considered 
possible models for delivering infrastructure. In the 
African context, much infrastructure has been damaged 
or become dilapidated in recent decades through civil 
war, collapse of state-owned institutions and economic 
stagnation. Corridors provide an opportunity to 
rehabilitate and modernise roads, railways and irrigation 
systems, and today’s corridor projects typically include 
this as an objective (Paul and Steinbrecher 2013).
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3.3.2 New visions for agricultural development
Another change in development thinking which has 
fuelled the trend for agricultural growth corridors is 
the recent increase in Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) committed to agriculture in Africa since around 
2007 (Umbadda and Ismail 2013). Similar to the upswing 
in public funding for infrastructure, there is renewed 
interest among donors and advisers in agriculture’s 
potential contribution to economic growth, exemplified 
most famously by the World Bank’s 2008 Agriculture 
for Development report. However, today’s funding 
strategies for ‘agriculture for development’ are inflected 
by contemporary ideas of neoliberalism, globalisation 
and, perhaps again, new institutional economics. 
For instance, increasingly, donors and development 
advisers are favouring private sector development 
approaches – particularly in agriculture (Humphrey 
2014; Cornelissen 2016; DCED 2017). This means 
creating both conditions for foreign private sector 
investment and an enabling environment for local small 
and medium-sized agribusinesses. 
Thus, consistent with the new emphasis on growth 
rather than aid and the importance placed on removing 
market barriers, many agricultural development 
programmes now include elements to improve upstream 
and downstream business links between suppliers, 
producers and processors. While crucial, infrastructure 
alone – it is argued – will not bring about the economic 
changes required for rural transformation (Kuhlmann et 
al. 2011; Weng et al. 2013). In a project document for 
a World Bank intervention in the SAGCOT corridor, for 
example, the lack of market linkages, rather than low 
agricultural production or yields, is identified as the most 
important impediment to smallholder livelihoods (World 
Bank 2016a). The modalities for delivering agricultural 
development, meanwhile, typically include the use of 
public–private partnerships, catalytic funding or market-
based approaches such as value chains or Making 
Markets Work for the Poor (M4P).
Type	of	
infrastructure
Role	of	infrastructure Potential	problem Consequence	of	problem
Roads •	 Enable produce to 
move rapidly and 
efficiently
•	 Support on-farm
        production
Poor quality roads •	 Adds to cost of transporting 
produce from farmgate to 
processing facility and/or 
wholesalers
•	 Prevents large bulk or 
refrigerated trucks from 
reaching producers or 
markets
Lack of roads •	 Farmers may not be able 
to reach local markets or 
agribusiness processors
Roads that become 
impassable in wet 
season
•	 Farmers are forced to sell 
produce in dry season at low 
prices
Post-harvest storage 
facilities
•	 Support on-farm 
production
•	 Lack of post-
harvest storage 
facilities
•	 Post-harvest losses
•	 Farmers cannot benefit 
from optimum marketing 
opportunities
Irrigation Low levels of 
investment in irrigation
•	 Farmers cannot afford own 
irrigation
Market exchanges 
and auction centres
•	 Support incomes
•	 Ensure efficient
       trading and 
       exchange
Lack of market 
exchanges and auction
centres
•	 Farmers are unable to 
improve margins
•	 Farmers cannot benefit from 
economies of scale in inputs
Agroprocessing
capacity
•	 Adds value to 
economy
Insufficient 
agroprocessing 
capacity
•	 Inability to provide products 
of sufficient quality, volume 
and reliability
Table 1: Infrastructure-related barriers to agricultural development
Source: Compiled by the author from the literature.
15Working Paper 01 | September 2017
The new thinking on ‘agriculture for development’ 
also continually highlights the need to bring small-
scale farmers into global markets and commercial 
value chains. Hence, Kuhlmann and colleagues, of 
the inclusive agriculture initiative TransFarm Africa, 
talk of the need to ‘tie smallholders into the stream of 
commerce’ (2011: 4), while the Dutch-funded Seas of 
Change value chains initiative looked for ‘commercially 
viable’ farmers to support. The schema developed 
by Dorward and colleagues of alternative livelihood 
pathways for poor farmers – of either ‘hanging in’, 
‘stepping up’ or ‘stepping out’ – appears to have had a 
strong influence (Dorward et al. 2009). There has been 
a growing concern among donors and advisers that 
agricultural development and agribusiness investment 
should be inclusive (e.g. AfDB 2013; Woodhill 2016; 
IFPRI 2016;) and yet at the same time, a belief that the 
poorest, least productive and least ‘market-oriented’ 
farmers should perhaps drop out of agriculture (rather 
than simply ‘hang in’?), sell their land to more productive 
farmers, and be absorbed into the labour market. The 
policy contradictions that this creates are already visible 
in the eastern seaboard corridors – something that will 
be discussed later, in Section 5. 
This brings us to one last strand of development thinking 
relevant to corridors, which relates to space and scale. 
Evident in documents for development corridors, as 
well as for rural development programmes, is a model 
or theory reminiscent of earlier thinking about linkages 
and trickle-down effects, whereby local entrepreneurs, 
progressive farmers or professional farming operators 
are expected to play an important spatial role in 
transmitting technology throughout an agricultural zone 
and in providing a link between commercial markets 
and dispersed local smallholder farmers. Corridors are, 
by their nature, a type of SDI. The development plans 
envisage the creation of networks and clusters in order 
to achieve economies of scale and impacts at scale 
and to link farmers through infrastructure into regional 
or even global systems of input provision and value 
addition. Examples include the 2SCALE project in West 
Africa (BOPIC, ICRA and IFDC 2015) or the Seas of 
Change initiative (Woodhill et al. 2012). Documentation 
for such programmes presents typical smallholder 
farmers as marginal actors who need to be brought into 
the mainstream, where the mainstream is understood 
to be the global agribusiness complex – as opposed to, 
say, local or informal food markets. 
The new development thinking on infrastructure and 
agriculture is highly conducive to corridor projects. All of 
these elements – funding for infrastructure and creating 
conditions for private sector investment, spatial models 
at scale, and support for better-off farmers to join 
globalised supply chains – are visible in the design of 
the agricultural growth corridors studied in depth in this 
paper.
3.4  The needs of private investors
A third aspect which has influenced the adoption of 
recent agricultural development corridors is the needs of 
private sector actors. These include: infrastructure firms; 
companies in the oil, gas and mining sectors; investors 
in large energy and infrastructure projects; multinational 
commodity traders and food and beverage companies; 
agricultural input producers; and domestic and foreign 
agribusiness concerns such as farmland asset firms 
and contract farm management firms. Their ‘needs’ 
include accommodations that national governments 
must make in order to attract investors but also the 
actions and demands of companies already present on 
the ground.
For example, the push for improved infrastructure, 
which is so fundamental to development corridors, 
is strongly linked to the needs of private companies. 
The minerals, oil and gas boom in Africa has been a 
strong driver of infrastructure projects, as mining has 
heavy demands for rail, electrification and shipping 
(Weng et al. 2013). Retailers and commodity traders, 
too, are requiring better infrastructure to deliver goods 
to growing demand in urban areas, supported by the 
discourse on a looming global food crisis (Nicol 2015; 
Scoones et al. 2014); while governments see provision 
of rural infrastructure as key to attracting investors in 
greenfield developments for agricultural production. The 
transportation component of development corridors 
therefore remains a core element of their design. 
We observed in Section 2 that the premise behind 
agricultural development corridors is to leverage or 
piggy-back on infrastructure that is being developed 
for the extractives sector or for national economic 
development more broadly. Just as was envisaged 
in South Africa in the 1990s, today’s planners and 
investors believe that mining concerns will not only help 
to fund infrastructure which they can exploit but will 
also create economic growth in rural towns, which will 
generate demand for agricultural goods.
However, experience has taught governments and 
development lenders that even for highly motivated 
actors such as mining companies, it may be necessary 
to provide innovative financing models and a public 
sector contribution to create sufficient conditions for 
infrastructural investment. Furthermore, it can be most 
effective to design projects that deliver more than one 
type of infrastructure for more than one sector, or that 
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offer additional business incentives to investors (Warner 
et al. 2008; Paul and Steinbrecher 2013). In particular, 
it has proved difficult to persuade investors to fund 
infrastructure purely for agriculture owing to the risks 
involved in that sector, with farming being an inherently 
risky activity and the ‘client base’ being geographically 
dispersed, often poor farmers from whom investors 
will not be easily able to recover their capital costs. 
This riskiness not only dampens investors’ appetite for 
specific agricultural infrastructure projects but also their 
willingness to invest in other agricultural opportunities 
such as greenfield plantations or processing businesses 
(as will be seen in Section 5, the levels of investment in 
development corridor projects have been lower than 
planners had hoped for, partly because of this risk 
aversion). Ironically, the very riskiness of agriculture 
demands a certain level of infrastructure to mitigate risk, 
including soft forms of infrastructure such as technology 
and communication.
Planners of agricultural development programmes, 
then, typically view infrastructure as crucial to achieving 
poverty reduction through commercialisation. It is thus 
not surprising that planners have responded favourably 
to corridor designs which bundle together multiple hard 
and soft infrastructural projects funded through public–
private partnerships and patient capital (Kaarhus 2011), 
and which may be closely linked to other sectors such 
as mining that will assume some of the costs and risks 
of investment.
It is also not surprising that the agricultural development 
corridors studied in this paper all envisage at least some 
of the produce from farmers in corridor zones being 
transported to ports for export. Paul and Steinbrecher 
(2013: 5) explain: 
Since private capital wants guaranteed returns 
on investment, export agriculture is likely to be 
a major focus, with infrastructure leading out 
of the country, probably towards other regions, 
rather than benefiting other African countries. The 
participation of corporate partners such as Cargill, 
Bunge and ADM link the Agricultural Growth 
Corridors projects firmly to the global commodity 
trade.
However, it is not only export-oriented corporations for 
whom corridors have been designed. Another type are 
national or regional players such as the beverage group 
SAB Miller, which has identified a strategic opportunity 
to increase production for supplying the growing urban 
populations and ‘bottom of the pyramid’ consumers in 
the corridor countries themselves. Another group with 
plenty at stake in the African development corridors are 
the corporations selling to African farmers as opposed 
to the corporations purchasing from African farmers – 
the input suppliers such as Yara, which has identified 
a potential to develop new markets for fertiliser, crop 
protection products, seeds and machinery (Bergius 
2016; Ouma, forthcoming). 
Corridors have provided a means for corporations 
and investors with varying interests to collaborate and 
benefit from positive externalities and economies of 
scale. But, as will be shown in Section 4, the existence 
of multiple ambitions – among them, inclusive value 
chain development, high-volume production for export 
and increasing sales of inputs to African farmers – can 
lead to contradictions in the design of development 
corridors and how they are being implemented. 
Returning to the question of scale, we perhaps see 
tensions between the need for corridors to function as 
just that – as linear routes for the movement of inputs 
and outputs – and the vision of corridors as clusters or 
hubs of localised rural regeneration.
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The areas where the four corridors are located are 
historically important trade and marketing routes, and all 
have featured (to some extent) settler farms, large-scale 
agriculture and state farms or ranches, which are being 
transformed in the corridor plans into clusters, hubs 
and demonstration farms. In contrast to the potential 
future laid out in the plans, the corridor areas have 
all experienced marginalisation or underdevelopment 
particularly in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) of 
Kenya (LAPSSET) and the civil war-affected areas of 
Mozambique (Beira and Nacala). Proponents claim that 
the corridors feature both high-potential farmland and 
large areas of underutilised land. In practice, the profile 
of the existing agricultural economy and the population 
density varies from area to area. It will be interesting 
to explore in the years ahead how these contextual 
similarities and differences affect outcomes.
This section summarises the scope of each of the 
eastern seaboard corridors and describes their historical 
context. Detailed analyses and sources are available in 
work by Shankland, Gonçalves and Favareto (2016) for 
Nacala, by Kaarhus (2011) and Maennling, Shah and 
Thomashausen (2014) for Beira, by Jenkins (2012) and 
Bergius (2016) for SAGCOT, and by Browne (2015) and 
Mosley and Watson (2016) for LAPSSET.
4.1  Nacala
The core concept of the Nacala development corridor 
as it emerged in the early 2000s is rehabilitation of the 
rail line that travels across northern Mozambique to the 
port at Nacala, which is one of the deepest and most 
highly valued ports in East Africa (JICA 2016; Synergia 
2016). The main purpose was to develop an alternative 
route for transporting coal from inland to the coast.2 
The plan includes a logistics corridor to travel from 
Tete province (a major coal-mining region) to Nacala 
through Malawi, and investment in a Nacala SEZ. The 
Mozambican government took advantage of private 
sector demand for a corridor to request that project 
financing cover additional rehabilitation of a spur rail 
line to Lichinga in the interest of regional development 
(Synergia 2016). The historical Nacala road and rail 
routes had been attacked by the militants of the 
Renamo opposition party during the 1980s and 1990s, 
to the extent that Malawi sent forces to protect this vital 
trade artery (Alden 2001).
However, Nacala is more than just a rehabilitated 
transport corridor for the extractives industry. In 2010, 
the government announced, in a national plan for 
agrarian sector development (Plano Estratégico para 
o Desenvolvimento do Sector Agrário, or PEDSA), 
that it intended to use the Nacala corridor (and others 
such as Beira and Maputo) to develop agricultural 
value chains (República de Moçambique 2010). The 
agricultural component of the Nacala corridor was 
further strengthened by the creation of the Programme 
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Figure 3: Location of the four eastern 
seaboard corridors
Source: Author’s own.
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for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah 
in Mozambique, or ProSAVANA, which was announced 
in 2009 and whose draft ‘master plan’ was leaked in 
2013 (Shankland and Gonçalves 2016). 
ProSAVANA  consists  of  three  components: 
(1) ‘extension and models’ (Projecto de Extensão e 
Modelos, PEM), a component for smallholder inclusion 
and engagement; (2) ‘research and technology transfer’ 
(Projecto de Investigação, PI); and (3) support for the 
agricultural development master plan (PD), which is 
aimed at engaging private investors in the Nacala 
corridor region. It covers 19 districts in the northern 
provinces of Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia. A 
separate PEDEC (Project for Nacala Corridor Economic 
Development Strategies) element of the corridor 
includes building capacity for land and environmental 
management – in part in anticipation of land disputes 
and environmental problems that may arise from the 
developments.
The ProSAVANA architects stated as their main 
objectives the development of market-oriented 
agriculture through regional agricultural clusters and 
value chains, and a shift in farming livelihoods from 
subsistence to sustainable commercial agriculture, 
working to strengthen ‘local leading farmers’. Further 
stated aims were to improve food security, create jobs 
and reduce rural poverty. The focus was on rice, soy, 
maize and cotton operations, but other targeted crops 
included sunflower and coffee, as well as poultry, cattle 
and pork. Initially, the plan was to produce commodities 
for both domestic and export markets in Africa and 
Asia (e.g. soy was intended both for export and for 
feed for associated livestock developments), and in a 
2014 presentation by Brazilian company Vale, it was 
clear that inputs such as fertiliser, fuel, wheat, clinker 
and sulphur were intended to be imported. In a revised 
master plan of 2015, there was more emphasis on local 
markets. 
4.2  Beira
The Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor (BAGC) concept 
was launched in 2010. As with the Nacala project to the 
north, the Beira corridor is a historically important route 
linking the port at Beira (located approximately 1,000km 
south of Nacala) with central Mozambique, Zimbabwe 
and other southern African countries.Like Nacala, the 
route’s infrastructure deteriorated during the1976-92 
civil war, and during the 2000s the Mozambican 
government faced pressure from mining companies 
(and, to a lesser extent, sugar companies) to improve 
port capacity at Beira as well as the trucking routes and 
rail lines linking Beira to operations inland, such as the 
mines in Tete province. This created an opportunity for 
proponents of agricultural growth corridors to leverage 
finance from government and mining companies to 
promote transformation of the agricultural sector in 
central Mozambique.
Whereas with the Nacala project, agricultural elements 
were added through PEDSA and ProSAVANA, 
agriculture was central to the BAGC concept’s 
design from the start. The BAGC plan includes the 
transformation of 190,000ha of farmland in Tete, 
Sofala and Manica provinces through irrigation and 
restructuring into livestock ranches, large irrigated 
sugarcane estates of 10,000 or more, medium-sized 
operations of 300–3,000ha (particularly for rice, field 
crops and horticulture), and irrigated smallholdings, 
which would comprise 35 percent of the total land 
allocated (AgDevCo 2010). There was to be investment 
in processing and milling facilities, promotion of fertiliser 
use, and an increase in provision of other inputs and 
extension services using nucleus farm ‘hubs’ and 
managed farm blocks in agribusiness clusters. Public 
and private sector funding was to be channelled to 
local businesses and farmers through a social venture 
Catalytic Fund and a matching grant Smallholder 
Support Facility managed by AgDevCo (an agribusiness 
investor and consultancy) and a BAGC secretariat.
This region of Mozambique was settled by white 
farmers in the nineteenth century and small-scale 
Portuguese farmers in the mid-twentieth century. After 
independence in 1975, state farms were established 
on the land of former estates and of the small-scale 
settlements. Many of these are now privately owned by 
absentee elites (Kaarhus 2011). In 2014, the population 
density of Manica, Sofala and Tete provinces was 33, 
32 and 26 people/km2 respectively.3 
4.3  SAGCOT
Presented to the World Economic Forum in 2011 – one 
year after BAGC was publicly launched – the project 
blueprint for the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor 
of Tanzania envisioned six agribusiness clusters, where 
investment would be channelled into large farms and 
plantations, outgrower schemes, irrigation works, post-
harvest storage and processing, as well as improvement 
to the road, rail and port infrastructure. The plan covers 
a huge area of southern Tanzania, stretching from 
the port at Dar es Salaam to across the border into 
northern Zambia. This is the route of the cross-national 
TAZARA railroad, which opened a new port outlet for 
Zambia in 1975 but subsequently fell into decline. The 
surrounding development area falls in the Tanzanian 
administrative regions of Iringa, Mbeya and Morogoro. 
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These are among six regions targeted in the Tanzania 
Bread-Basket Transformation Project funded by the 
Alliance for a Green Revolution Africa (AGRA) and are 
historically important agricultural production zones for a 
range of crops such as maize and rice, and cash crops 
such as sunflower and tea. Mbeya and Iringa are also 
areas of labour outmigration to neighbouring Morogoro 
and other rural and urban centres (Wenban-Smith 
2015). As of 2012, the population densities of Iringa, 
Mbeya and Morogoro were 18, 40 and 34 people/km2 
respectively.4 The SAGCOT initiative aims to bring at 
least 350,000 additional hectares of farmland in the 
region into commercial production (World Bank 2016a).
Once the SAGCOT project was endorsed and 
supported by powerful bodies such as the national 
government and the World Bank, high ambitions 
of SAGCOT were set. The stated aims focused on 
commercialising tens of thousands of small farmers, 
increasing farmers’ adoption of technology and other 
inputs (including fertiliser), and creating a business-
friendly environment for revenue-generating agricultural 
value chains. Underlying this were the rhetorical aims of 
Green Revolution and making better use of underutilised 
land. SAGCOT also aimed to lift two million people out 
of poverty. A wide range of crops were identified for 
development (among them rice, sugar, sunflower, soy, 
wheat and barley, high-value crops such as avocado, 
macadamia and tomato, and dairy and livestock) and 
project documents specified that some produce would 
be for export.
4.4  LAPSSET
Whereas Nacala and its ProSAVANA programme, 
BAGC and SAGCOT may be considered agricultural 
growth corridors according to the classification from 
Section 2, LAPSSET is more accurately considered as 
an economic corridor with agriculture as a secondary or 
‘densification’ component. 
The LAPSSET corridor concept was developed over 
decades, largely driven by oil interests. Launched in its 
current form in 2011, LAPSSET comprises: a plan for a 
deep port, oil refinery and SEZ at Lamu; a 500m-wide 
corridor of road, rail, pipeline, electrical power lines 
and fibre optics to connect Lamu with a new airport 
and tourist resort at Isiolo in central Kenya, where the 
corridor forks and continues west and north across 
the borders into Ethiopia and South Sudan; and a 
100km-wide economic corridor flanking the pipeline 
and communications corridor. It is an enormous 
development project, with an investment budget 
equivalent to half of Kenya’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Repcon Associates 2017). 
The corridor in Kenya traverses nine counties – Lamu, 
Garissa, Marsabit, Isiolo, Meru, Turkana, Samburu, 
Baringo and Laikipia – whose population density in 2009 
ranged from 6 people/km2 in Isiolo to 61 people/km2 
in Baringo (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2015). 
These are part of the northern Kenyan arid and semi-arid 
lands (ASALs), which have experienced economic and 
political marginalisation (Odhiambo 2013).5 Pastoralism 
is an important component of the ASAL agricultural 
economy. Much of the LAPSSET route is proximate 
to cross-country livestock marketing corridors and 
while most land remains officially as trust land under 
communal pastoral or agro-pastoral systems, several 
private and state ranches were established in the region 
during the 1960s and 1970s (Smalley and Corbera 
2012; Njoka et al. 2016). 
The marginalised, dryland context of LAPSSET is 
different from the contexts of SAGCOT, Nacala and 
BAGC and has some implications for possible outcomes 
of the corridor’s development. New investment projects 
such as LAPSSET are an opportunity to redress 
the historical marginalisation of Kenya’s ASALs and 
perhaps contribute to climate resilience. There will be 
greater scope for livestock-related projects such as 
abattoirs or improving cross-border and rural–urban 
livestock marketing routes. However, there is a risk that 
the historical bias against pastoralism will see priority 
given to irrigated farming projects rather than initiatives 
to support herding livelihoods, and that both poorly 
planned project components and the rush to control 
land and natural resources will exacerbate class and 
gender inequality in pastoral areas and lead to land 
rights infringements (Birch and Lind 2014).
The LAPSSET corridor initiative is a flagship project 
of Kenya’s Vision 2030 development plan (Repcon 
Associates 2017). LAPSSET’s stated aims are to 
promote regional trade, develop Kenya’s marginalised 
drylands, and increase jobs, economic growth and 
GDP. The Kenyan government frames the corridor 
according to its wider ambition of ‘positioning Kenya 
as an economic power house in Africa... infusing new 
technology and skills into the economy and more critical 
bring[ing] to reality the dream of a social-economic 
rebirth of the Kenyan nation’ (LCDA 2016: 17). A key 
rhetorical phrase has been ‘unlocking potential’ for 
Kenya’s drylands (Nicol 2015).
Although agriculture was not at the heart of the initiative 
as conceived, in its 2013–17 planning document for 
Vision 2030, the government included agricultural 
development along the LAPSSET Corridor as a priority 
programme, with the forthcoming High Grand Falls dam 
expected to bring hundreds of thousands of hectares 
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of land in the region into irrigation (Kenya Vision2030 
2013; Tarda 2017). Targeted agribusiness and value 
chain developments include large-scale sugarcane and 
mango schemes in Kenya and Ethiopia, and livestock 
and related food processing projects and potential 
opportunities in floriculture and horticulture, sugar and 
coffee (LCDA 2016; Repcon Associates 2017: 21). 
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EASTERN SEABOARD CORRIDOR     
INTEREST GROUpS AND 
INFLUENCES
The four eastern seaboard corridors were launched 
around eight to ten years ago, and have progressed 
to varying degrees. The documentation available so 
far suggests there has been some significant deviation 
from their original design and aims, mainly in response 
to conflicts of interest and unexpected events. To help 
understand the political-economic dynamics, this 
section identifies the main actors involved and how they 
have influenced the corridors’ development and early 
implementation. 
5.1  Nacala
The plans for the Nacala development corridor – and 
also for Beira – were strongly influenced by the increased 
activity of extractives firms in Mozambique’s north-west 
Tete province during the early 2000s. An investment 
and mining boom at that time led to demands on the 
Mozambican government to improve infrastructure for 
use by the extractives industry in the region (coal, iron 
ore, titanium and natural gas) (Portos e Caminhos de 
Ferro de Moçambique 2013; Justiça Ambiental 2016). 
The driving force behind the transport and logistics 
element of the Nacala project has been the Brazilian 
mining company Vale. Vale included railway and port 
development as part of its bid to develop the Moatize 
coal mine in Tete and until recently it owned 70 percent 
of the Nacala Logistics Corridor with fellow mining group 
Mitsui (Mitsui acquired Vale’s share in March 2017). 
Vale was one of several Brazilian and Japanese mining 
and agribusiness interests which have shaped the 
design and early implementation of the Nacala project. 
A coalition of political and business interests in Brazil, 
Japan and Mozambique have given the Nacala corridor 
a singular character: compared with the other three 
eastern seaboard corridors, Nacala has a stronger 
emphasis on soy cultivation (reflecting the Brazil–
Japan links) and more projects in agricultural research 
(reflecting the contributions of Brazilian and Japanese 
agronomists). 
Indeed, a Brazilian consultancy, GV Agro, helped to 
develop the ProSAVANA agricultural programme in its 
early stages. The importance of the port at Nacala has 
long attracted business interest in the hinterland farming 
areas in Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia. Authors 
Cabral (2016) and Shankland and Gonçalves (2016) 
explain that ProSAVANA was a combined result of: 
(1) efforts by former Brazilian president Lula to market 
Brazilian agribusiness abroad; (2) investment ambitions 
of Brazilian companies in the Nacala hinterland; (3) long-
standing support by Japan of Brazil’s development of 
its cerrado savannah region for soybean production; 
and (4) the endorsement by both Japan and the World 
Bank of a similar model of agricultural development 
that could be transferred to the African savannah. 
On this last point, Mozambique was argued to be an 
ideal savannah zone for development owing to its low 
population density and land underutilisation. In point 
of fact, Niassa has a low population density of 13 
people/km2, but it is higher in Zambezia (48 people/
km2) and Nampula (65 people/km2).5 Proponents of 
ProSAVANA highlighted unused arable land in the 
Nacala corridor region and argued that development 
in the hinterland could follow the experience of soy 
farming in the cerrado since the 1970s (World Bank 
2009; Cabral 2016). Although the programme was 
claimed in a ProSAVANA communications leaflet to 
be ‘A programme in Mozambique by Mozambicans’, 
Shankland and Gonçalves (2016) note that similarities 
between the Brazilian cerrado and Mozambican 
savannah were repeatedly stressed to justify the extent 
of Brazilian influence. 
A large number of companies and joint ventures 
have acquired thousands of hectares of land in the 
Nacala region – although it is unclear to what extent 
this has occurred as part of the ProSAVANA project. 
They include Grupo Pinesso, a Brazilian agribusiness 
firm; Mozaco (Mozambique Agricultural Corporation), 
established in 2013 by Rioforte Investments 
(Portuguese holding company for Grupo Espirito Santo) 
and JFS Holding (Portuguese cotton company); and 
AgroMoz (a partnership involving the richest man in 
Portugal, the former president of Mozambique and 
one of the largest land-holders in Brazil). According 
to the Mozambique National Peasants’ Union (União 
Nacional de Camponeses or UNAC) and GRAIN 
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(2015: 5), ‘a number of foreign companies, some in 
collaboration with local businesses linked to members 
of Mozambique’s ruling Frelimo party, have already 
acquired large areas of farmland in the area and have 
displaced thousands of peasant families’. The region is 
historically a stronghold of the Renamo opposition.
In addition to the Brazilian and Japanese investment, 
companies have also made use of foreign donors 
such as the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Norfund 
and the European Union (EU), International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
to obtain land and subsidise the establishment of 
outgrower operations (UNAC and GRAIN 2015). The 
activities have included acquisition of former state 
farms and community land for commodities such as 
soy, cotton, rice and poultry. In 2012, the Brazilian 
consultancy FGV Projetos launched a private equity 
fund (the Nacala Corridor Fund) to invest capital in 
agricultural production and input businesses in the 
corridor region, stating that rice, soy, maize and cotton 
were the priority crops (FGV Projetos 2013). 
The design of the Nacala corridor – specifically, the 
ProSAVANA agricultural element – has undergone the 
greatest resistance from civil society of all four eastern 
seaboard corridors, with the possible exception 
of LAPSSET. Active and effective resistance from 
Mozambican, Brazilian, Japanese and international 
non-government organisations (NGOs) and unions 
from 2012 to 2015 led to the ProSAVANA master 
plan being rewritten in 2015 under guidance of JICA, 
‘which had become very concerned to present itself as 
“pro-peasant” in the face of rising criticism of its role 
in ProSAVANA by Japanese civil society’ (Cabral 2016; 
Shankland and Gonçalves 2016: 42). The revised plan 
placed more emphasis on smallholder agriculture and 
less emphasis on exports. 
Despite ProSAVANA’s emphasis on producer 
organisations, capacity building and market models 
for smallholders, relatively few such projects have 
been documented thus far (Shankland and Gonçalves 
2016: 36). Of all the corridors, Nacala has the clearest 
strategy for reaching farmers and effecting change 
in rural areas, through the ProSAVANA programme. 
However, early signs are that implementation is taking 
a different direction. Project design and objectives have 
been changed to accommodate strong civil society 
pressure on the one hand (as discussed above) and 
agribusiness interests on the other. Critical observers 
argue that the aims of ProSAVANA have become ‘fuzzy’ 
and the role of transnational capital in the programme 
has been concealed from public view (Shankland and 
Gonçalves 2016: 43; Cabral 2016: 99). The influence 
of the Brazilian and Mozambican agribusiness sector, 
and the discursive power of large-scale cerrado/
savannah transformation, may be acting against more 
smallholder-focused initiatives. 
In addition, progress has been delayed by a fall in 
commodity prices and a decline in interest from Brazilian 
investors (Cabral 2016). Progress may also have been 
impeded by political instability. Two decades after civil 
war, tensions between Renamo and the ruling Frelimo 
party have once again escalated in the Nacala corridor 
region, with outbreaks of violence in the Tete coal-
mining province and an attack on a train in Nampula in 
November 2016 attributed to armed Renamo fighters 
(Fiorin 2016).
5.2  Beira
Beira shares many contextual similarities with Nacala: 
a government open to foreign investment and the 
promise of a Green Revolution, a historically important 
transport corridor needing rehabilitation, and a poor 
rural economy featuring lapsed state farms and the 
legacy of civil war. However, the BAGC has been 
designed and developed differently.
The agricultural industry has been more prominent 
in the BAGC architecture than with Nacala, although 
the extractives industry is also influential and was 
instrumental in this latest chapter of the Beira 
corridor’s history. Rather than the Brazilian and 
Japanese consultants of Nacala, documentation on 
Beira reveals a different set of key players, including 
Yara International, AGRA, AgDevCo and Prorustica, 
which also collaborated on the SAGCOT blueprint 
(as noted elsewhere). According to Kaarhus (2011), 
while the Mozambican government was keen on the 
agricultural growth corridor approach, the specific 
design of BAGC was developed by Yara and a group 
of agribusiness consultants and investors, including 
AGRA and AgDevCo. Their ideas were welcomed by 
the Mozambican government, which was looking to 
promote public–private partnerships in the agricultural 
sector. The cerrado/savannah rhetoric is still evident in 
BAGC documentation, but another vision is provided 
by AGRA of Beira becoming a ‘breadbasket’ for 
Mozambique and southern Africa. 
Yara announced plans to invest in a fertiliser terminal 
at Beira port, before turning its attention to SAGCOT 
(Kaarhus 2011), and a Catalytic Fund and Smallholder 
Support Facility were established, under the 
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management of AgDevCo, for commercial agriculture 
investments. As of 2014, 2,821 farmers were connected 
as outgrowers to Catalytic Fund projects – much lower 
than the ambitious target of 7,500 farmers; and 10,737 
farmers were receiving access to irrigation, inputs or 
finance (DFID 2015). Foreign donors such as DFID, 
USAID and JICA have also provided finance. 
Documents suggest that competing interests in the 
architecture of the Beira corridor may have caused 
disruption. In 2013–14, disagreements over the scope 
and finances of the initiative, with a lack of trust between 
AgDevCo and the multi-stakeholder BAGC Partnership, 
delayed progress with the project pipeline. DFID 
decided to withdraw its support for the BAGC after 
2015 and AgDevCo resigned as a Fund Manager in 
early 2015 (DFID 2015). According to the African Centre 
for Biodiversity (2015: 8), there were complaints that 
AgDevCo was prioritising medium-scale commercial 
farmers, who also tend to be foreign. 
Comparatively less infrastructural activity is visible for 
the BAGC than at Nacala, perhaps because Beira is 
a less-prized port. However, the literature suggests 
that Beira may have made more progress with 
smallholder programmes – even though Nacala may 
have the stronger emphasis on smallholders through 
the revised ProSAVANA programme. This is partly due 
to the inception in 2011 of the PROIRRI Sustainable 
Irrigation Development Project, which was designed 
to be aligned with the BAGC (World Bank 2011). 
Funded by the World Bank, JICA and the Mozambican 
government, PROIRRI involves irrigation development 
for medium- and small-scale rice cultivation and 
horticulture, promotion of outgrower schemes, and 
grants for inputs, equipment or post-harvest facilities. 
Although the project was scaled down, a World Bank 
report (2016b: 7) records that ‘PROIRRI disbursed MZN 
7,825,678 to procure seeds and fertilizers under the 
Window 1 and MZN 1,631,699 for tractors, plows and 
animal traction under the Window 2, which benefited 
675 horticulture farmers in Sofala and 250 rice farmers’. 
It is too early to assess the long-term impacts of this or 
of projects supported through the Catalytic Fund, but 
it may be of note that PROIRRI is a publicly financed 
project, which was not a central element of the BAGC 
blueprint.
5.3  SAGCOT
In Tanzania, the ideas that would develop into SAGCOT 
appear to have originated around 2005 as a strategy to 
increase demand for fertiliser among Tanzanian farmers 
by supporting the growth of high-value agricultural 
markets, which would then stimulate and facilitate 
greater use of inputs. The key actor was Yara, which 
joined forces with the Agricultural Council of Tanzania 
and the agribusiness consultancy Prorustica to form 
the Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (TAP), and then 
developed the concept of an agricultural growth 
corridor in 2008 with AgDevCo, another agribusiness 
investor and consultancy. 
The SAGCOT development process grew substantially 
to embrace a large number of private sector companies 
and donors as well as the Tanzanian government, 
whose agricultural policies – not least the 2009 Kilimo 
Kwanza (Agriculture First) initiative – had increasingly 
targeted private sector investment. SAGCOT was 
promoted in investor roadshows by the domestic 
government under former Tanzanian President Jakaya 
Kikwete, and became even more closely aligned to 
government policy in 2012–13 when it was connected 
to the Big Results Now initiative to fast-track agricultural 
investments inside and outside the SAGCOT area 
(Ouma, forthcoming).6 
SAGCOT is alone among the four eastern seaboard 
corridors in having agriculture as the primary industry, 
with no extractives operations to ‘anchor’ the corridor. 
This gives free rein to domestic and international 
agribusiness to drive direction and investment, 
facilitated by the Tanzania Investment Centre. The 
agribusiness actors include a number of joint ventures 
and ‘umbrella’ industry bodies, such as the TAP Rice 
Partnership, Africa Potato Initiative and Kapunga Rice 
Project.
A striking element of SAGCOT is the extent to which 
private sector companies funded, and gave input to, 
the development of the corridor blueprint, alongside 
multilateral donors and lenders:
[Contributors] included the Tanzanian government, 
the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID), AGRA, the Norwegian Embassy, and 
Norfund, as well as a larger group of companies 
adding their cumulative weight to the initiative: 
Yara, Dupont, Monsanto, General Mills, SAB 
Miller, Syngenta, Standard Bank, and the National 
Microfinance Bank. (Jenkins 2012: 16) 
Having been presented by Yara to meetings of the UN 
Private Sector Forum in 2008 and the World Economic 
Forum in 2010, SAGCOT attracted further interest of 
multiple donors and companies. Tens of millions of 
dollars have been provided in grants or loans from DFID, 
USAID and the World Bank, and additional funding 
comes from other organisations such as the Danish 
International Development Agency (DANIDA), JICA, 
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Norfund and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. A 
Catalytic Fund was established to provide concessional 
funding, and the World Bank is providing matching 
grants for agribusiness companies to set up forms of 
contract farming schemes with smallholders. Varied 
Tanzanian and international companies – mainly 
input sellers and producers, and a smaller number of 
downstream buyers, providers of finance and irrigation 
infrastructure – have pledged around US$1bn after 
paying to become 30 SAGCOT ‘partners’ (New Alliance 
2012: 1, cited in Bergius 2016). European investors lent 
US$65m to the National Microfinance Bank of Tanzania 
for the provision of loans to farmers and businesses.
A wide range of agricultural and agribusiness operations 
are argued to be part of SAGCOT; examples include 
development of smallholder tea estates by Unilever, 
an investment by the Dutch group FrieslandCampina 
with Tanzanian dairy cooperatives, a Tanzanian-owned 
avocado packing house and development of a wind farm 
(and some of those operations have accessed finance 
for modernising or expanding). It is not yet possible 
to say that these enterprises are functioning within a 
system of hubs and clusters as outlined in the SAGCOT 
blueprint. There is also no sense of coherence in the 
pattern of agricultural developments under SAGCOT in 
terms of crop, size or farming model. 
Critics argue that the transnational agri-food regime is 
using SAGCOT, aided by donors, to develop markets in 
Tanzania for inputs and increase supply of commodities 
for export (Paul and Steinbrecher 2013; Bergius 2016). 
Bergius (ibid.: 7–8) reports that the government has 
excluded activist groups from SAGCOT and notes 
that although four agricultural organisations are listed 
as official SAGCOT partners,7 the largest network of 
smallholder farmers in Tanzania, Mtandao wa Vikundi 
vya Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA), was not included 
in any discussions.
5.4  LAPSSET
In contrast to the three preceding corridor projects, 
whose main actors have been the private sector or 
foreign governments, the LAPSSET initiative has 
been driven by the host Kenyan government (Browne 
2015). Its roots lie in political and commercial interests 
since the 1960s to develop a major port at Lamu 
on Kenya’s coast and pipe oil to Kenya from Sudan. 
Browne (2015) describes the crystallisation of those 
interests into a corridor concept in the early 2000s as 
a highly geopolitical process. It involved the Kenyan 
government’s ambition to restore Kenya’s reputation 
as a stable economic gateway to East Africa after the 
post-election violence in 2008; the movement in South 
Sudan towards independence in 2011; Ethiopia’s 
economic growth and demand for an alternative port 
outlet to Djibouti; rising oil prices and international 
interest from Kuwait and Qatar; and the discovery of 
crude oil in Uganda. 
The main administrative body in Kenya is the LAPSSET 
Corridor Development Authority (LCDA), established 
in 2013 within the presidency. Kenyan government 
officials have been closely involved in the construction 
of the Lamu port (Makena 2015). Over the years, 
disagreements, negotiations and differing priorities 
between Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia 
have obstructed progress. Ethiopia ‘lost patience’ and 
built a 700km-long railway costing US$4bn between 
Addis Ababa and Djibouti; while Uganda opted to 
route its new-found crude oil to Tanzania, dealing a 
blow to the proposed pipeline from Lamu to Lokichar 
(and across into Uganda) (GTAI 2016). The political 
challenges presented by cross-border corridors have 
been well documented (Thomas 2009).
Aside from the state, other key interest groups 
comprise extractive, power and telecoms firms. Tullow 
Oil is an important player, having discovered petroleum 
near Lake Turkana in 2012. These firms’ strategic 
interests are central to the LAPSSET concept. Activities 
include construction of a fibre-optic network along the 
LAPSSET corridor by African group Liquid Telecom 
(Bocha 2014), prior development (begun in 2006) of 
the Lake Turkana Wind Power Project, seismic surveys 
in the Tana Delta (Kroes and van Gelder 2014), and 
proposals for a coal-fired power plant in Lamu. Such 
activities have required substantial debt and private 
equity financing from investors and development 
banks. Funding for the port and road improvements has 
also been provided by lenders such as the World Bank, 
the African Development Bank and the Development 
Bank of South Africa. As with the other three eastern 
seaboard corridors, the literature highlights the role of 
Japan (which is reportedly a major importer of South 
Sudanese oil) and Japanese consultants. Generally, 
donors are increasingly supportive of cross-border 
infrastructure projects such as LAPSSET, which could 
help to increase trade and regional integration in the 
Horn of Africa (Nicol 2015).
The priority for LAPSSET is to develop an oil pipeline 
and port in the context of regional integration, and the 
agriculture industry has had relatively little influence in 
comparison with the three other corridors. Although 
a small number of livestock and agriculture-related 
projects have been proposed by the government and 
interested companies and donors to take advantage of 
the planned infrastructural improvements, the Kenyan 
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Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries has 
not played a prominent role. The few actors observed 
in this area include the Kenya Agribusiness and 
Agroindustry Alliance, which promotes investment 
in the mango industry in the Tana River Delta near 
Lamu, and the international development organisation 
Mennonite Economic Development Associates, which 
runs a project for supporting small and medium-sized 
agricultural enterprises in the LAPSSET area. 
LAPSSET has proved to be a volatile and changeable 
project. In addition to the geopolitical manoeuvrings 
described above, there have been delays in financing 
(BMI Research 2014) and the project has also been 
hampered by security issues, such as the Al-Shabaab 
threat and civil war in South Sudan (Browne 2015). As 
agriculture is not a core element, LAPSSET has not 
attracted opposition from pro-peasant groups similar to 
that seen with Nacala, but there has been substantial 
activism on environmental and land aspects of 
LAPSSET by civil society groups, such as Save Lamu (a 
coalition of 35 civil society organisations (CSOs), which 
filed a legal petition against the port) and the Mipakani 
project (a civil society watchdog run by the Rift Valley 
Institute, Heinrich Böll Foundation and LAPSSET 
Community Forum). The Kenyan activists have links 
to international organisations such as the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and UNESCO; 
and well-publicised environmental concerns may have 
been a factor in Uganda’s decision to route its oil pipeline 
through Tanzania rather than use the LAPSSET corridor 
(Musisi and Muhumuza 2016). There may yet be further 
disruption, as in early 2017 a Strategic Environmental 
Assessment recommended that the LAPSSET be 
re-routed in several sections to protect wildlife corridors 
and habitats, notably near Isiolo Town, where much 
development and land speculation has already taken 
place (Elliott 2016; Repcon Associates 2017: xxxvi).
5.5  Summary
A review of the literature finds that the primary drivers 
of the Nacala, Beira and SAGCOT corridors are not 
the host governments but rather groups of private 
sector actors, ranging from the Brazilian agribusiness 
lobby to Tanzanian agri-processors to multinational 
energy and telecoms firms. A vast number of donors, 
consultants and investors are involved in these public–
private partnerships. Although some actors such 
as Yara, AgDevCo or JICA are involved in more than 
one corridor, the way that public and private interests 
interact with each other and with local stakeholders is 
specific to each corridor, and specific narratives have 
been used to legitimise the corridors in each context. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the key characteristics 
of the four corridors. The final section draws some 
conclusions for the political-economic dynamics of the 
eastern seaboard corridors.
26 Working Paper 01 | September 2017
Nacala Beira SAGCOT LAPSSET
Corridor type Agricultural growth corridor Agricultural growth 
corridor
Agricultural growth 
corridor
Economic corridor with 
secondary agriculture
Anchor project Coal mining Coal mining None Oil pipeline
Location of port Nacala, Mozambique Beira, Mozambique Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania
Lamu, Kenya
Corridor 
locations in the 
main country
Nampula, Niassa, 
Zambezia provinces
Manica, Sofala, Tete 
provinces
Iringa, Mbeya, 
Morogoro regions
Lamu, Garissa, Marsabit, 
Isiolo, Meru, Turkana, 
Samburu, Baringo and 
Laikipia counties
Key actors Brazilian and Japanese 
mining and agribusiness 
firms, FGV Projetos and 
other consultancies, 
Mozambican elites, 
Renamo, civil society
Mining firms, Yara, 
AgDevCo, Prorustica, 
AGRA
Yara, AgDevCo, 
Prorustica, AGRA, 
Tanzanian agri lobby, 
multinational traders 
and food companies, 
Tanzanian government
Kenyan government, Tullow Oil 
and other extractives, power and 
telecoms firms, civil society
Underlying 
objectives
Rehabilitate and 
commercialise agriculture, 
support mining industry, 
facilitate Brazilian 
agribusiness expansion
Rehabilitate and 
commercialise 
agriculture, support 
mining industry
Drive fertiliser sales, 
increase foreign 
investment
Reassert Kenya’s regional 
standing, increase trade and 
energy security
Narratives Breadbasket, cerrado Breadbasket, cerrado, 
‘empty’ arable land 
Green revolution, 
breadbasket, under-
used land
Technocracy, ‘unlocking 
potential’ of drylands
Key donors JICA DFID, Norad, World 
Bank (PROIRRI), JICA
DFID, World Bank, EU, 
USAID
AfDB, World Bank, EU, 
Development Bank of South 
Africa
Table 2: Key characteristics of the four corridors
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6. DISCUSSION
6.1  Competing interests in corridor  
 developments
Reviewing the four eastern seaboard corridors reveals 
a tremendous variety of interest groups that are 
promoting, funding, governing and resisting these 
complex projects.
Development of the corridors has been possible 
because actors in the extractives and agribusiness 
sectors were able to express their strategic goals in 
spatial terms. Doing this allowed them to align their 
ambitions of expansion into new territories or new 
markets with the interests of domestic governments 
and international donors. The private sector strategies 
aligned with government and donor priorities in three 
key areas: firstly, in the area of infrastructure, which 
governments and donors were increasingly prioritising 
for investment; secondly, in the growing emphasis in 
development policy on attracting foreign investment and 
facilitating private sector development; and thirdly, in the 
attractiveness to governments and donors of certain 
forms of spatial development or territorialism – be it the 
value chain and SDIs endorsed by donors, or states 
aiming to increase regional trade and political influence, 
or to use policies of agricultural commercialisation and 
modernisation to reduce poverty in rural areas.
It is this context which allowed the recent agricultural 
corridor projects to win such broad support and to 
be promoted as poverty alleviation tools, despite the 
highly prominent position given to the interests of 
foreign capital in the project designs. Only LAPSSET 
is a creation of central government; Nacala, BAGC 
and SAGCOT are largely donor- and corporate-
driven. However, government officials are facilitating 
the projects, providing governance and finding 
opportunities to benefit.
Yet despite the complementarity of public and private 
sector interests in many respects, the eastern seaboard 
corridors have unfurled in unexpected ways, with 
disruptions ranging from geopolitical manoeuvring 
to investment setbacks to governance issues to civil 
society opposition. We are seeing what Ouma calls 
‘The Messy Actualities of Market-oriented Agricultural 
Governance’ (2016, forthcoming). One important 
development to watch is political instability: Frelimo 
and Renamo tensions are resurgent in Nacala and 
Beira, while LAPSSET has seen land disputes in Isiolo 
and Islamist insurgency. How will instability affect the 
implementation of corridor plans? 
There is another possible source of tensions. Bundling 
together different types of investment covering logistics 
and agricultural production while balancing public 
welfare and commercial objectives requires not only 
good planning and governance but patient capital 
and compromise between competing interests and 
conceptualisations of development. The question 
arises: are there tensions inherent to agricultural growth 
corridors between a demand for linear routes and the 
strategy to develop localised clusters?
Table 3 suggests the range of interests that have 
influenced the eastern seaboard corridors to date and 
that may co-exist in any one project. It may help us to 
understand that farmers and herders themselves are 
minority voices in the political drama, and that poverty 
alleviation and rural development are not always 
consistent with the other motivations behind corridor 
developments.
6.2  Promoting better outcomes   
 from corridor projects
Returning to the central question of how corridors 
reshape agricultural commercialisation pathways and 
rural livelihoods, with what impacts and for whom, it 
is too soon to review the outcomes of Nacala, Beira, 
SAGCOT and LAPSSET. However, it is possible to 
collate impacts that have been reported so far, as 
well as impacts documented in the literature on older 
corridors and agricultural clusters in sub-Saharan Africa 
and other developing countries (Table 4; note that most 
studies have concentrated on macroeconomic and 
trade-related aspects). These preliminary outcomes, 
as well as observations on the interest groups and 
underlying motivations of the four eastern seaboard 
developments, allow us to set out some critical 
questions on the political economy of the corridors 
and their potential to support women’s empowerment, 
local business and the poorest members of farming and 
pastoralist societies in the region. 
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Motivation Key	actors
Expand into African hinterland Business (e.g. Yara, Brazilian soy interests)
Increase trade and exports Business (e.g. Olam, Unilever), food-insecure states, 
port authorities
Control supply or support production through logistics 
or market linkages
Business (e.g. local processors, supermarkets, SAB 
Miller)
Attract and assuage investors Business, domestic governments
Rehabilitate infrastructure and state farms Domestic governments
Acquire land, patronage, a share of the benefits Elites
Control territory and local politics Central and local authorities, Renamo, Islamists
Achieve stability, spread risk Investors, planners
Protect people or the environment Civil society, environmental NGOs, donors
Alleviate poverty Domestic governments, local authorities, donors
Increase input intensity Business (e.g. Yara), development advisers (e.g. AGRA)
Foster value addition and professional agriculture Domestic governments, donors, development advisers, 
local authorities
Foster regional integration NEPAD, Kenyan government
Connect to markets Farmers and herders
Improve access to inputs and services Farmers and herders, small and medium-size enterprises 
(SMEs)
Table 3: Competing interests in corridor developments
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Impact	area Impact
1.	Inception	phase
Land Local community members’ loss of land to public or private actors through land-
grabbing and undemocratic acquisition. Rise in land prices due to speculation may foster 
small-scale land grabbing by elites and local residents.
Some corridors include community displacement and resettlement schemes.
Labour Job creation (e.g. temporary construction roles).
Environment Environmental degradation from land clearance and construction work.
Power	and	
institutions 
Emergence of new power structures and elites. 
2.	During	implementation
Transport	and	trade Reduction in transport times and costs, leading to increased haulage volumes and 
lower costs for business.
Reduction in border crossing times.
Increase in road accidents.
Farming	livelihoods In successful cases, farmers experience improved productivity, improved physical 
access to markets and improved access to high-value markets and to inputs 
and services. Such cases lead to higher incomes for farming households.
Some of the ‘soft’ initiatives implemented as part of development corridors may help 
farmers to meet quality standards and achieve certification.
In negative cases, small farmers experience shocks from global markets or are 
excluded from the new market opportunities by transaction costs or quality standards.
Business In successful cases, the improved infrastructure and other investments stimulate 
growth in local businesses, while soft projects improve the small business 
environment.
In negative cases, upstream and downstream spillover effects for local SMEs are 
minimal, as business is dominated by large and/or foreign enterprises and capital is 
even concentrated within them, and small businesses experience negative impacts.
Improved investment environment
Labour Job creation (e.g. permanent roles). 
However, in some cases the nature of employment offered by new agribusiness 
in corridor areas provides only limited, low-wage employment or creates 
‘vulnerabilities’ in the local labour market.
There may also be impacts – positive or negative – on labour conditions.
Power	and	
institutions
Greater collaboration among public and private actors, and improved quality of 
farmers’ collective institutions.
Creation of public–private partnership models that can be replicated elsewhere.
Improvement in local governance.
Technology transfer and innovation.
Foster an improved policy and institutional context for supporting small-scale 
farmers and helping them adjust to the globalised agri-food complex.
Health	and	welfare Increase in sex work and HIV/AIDS transmission along routes.
Increase in health of local household members.
Environment Environmental pollution and over-extraction of water. 
Table 4: Documented impacts of agricultural corridors and other spatial development initiatives
Source: Compiled by the author from multiple sources, including Mtegha et al. 2012; Kibugi et al. 2015; Browne 2015; Maennling et al. 2014; UNAC and GRAIN 2015; 
Gálvez-Nogales 2014, 2010; Laurance et al. 2015; World Bank 2016; Muigua 2012, cited in Makena 2015; BOPIC, ICRA and IFDC 2015; Walvis Bay Corridor Group 
2017; Byiers et al. 2016; DFID 2015; Kuhlmann et al. 2011; Taylor 2000; ECDPM 2015.
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6.2.1 Governance and land
Launching corridor projects involves the establishment 
of governance architecture such as secretariats, funds 
and implementation agencies. These bodies can 
become powerful decision-makers and conduits of 
capital. As the experience of DFID and AgDevCo in 
Beira shows, they may face protests from stakeholders 
over how they interpret their mandates for corridor 
implementation. Corridors can lead to changes in, or 
creation of, new power structures. Inside and outside 
formal bodies, the demands and business ambitions of 
the private sector have offered various opportunities for 
local elites, from brokering deals to accessing financing 
for their own businesses to facilitating land acquisition. 
Corridor development affords a crucial role to those 
with power to allocate land. In all four corridors, land 
has been repurposed by the state (often through 
compulsory acquisition) or private investors for roads 
and railways, large-scale farms, mining concessions, 
port development or support buildings and facilities. 
Some corridors include community displacement 
and resettlement schemes.8 This process has been 
facilitated by the administrative structures put in place 
to make land available for infrastructure and agricultural 
investments. The Direito do Uso e Aproveitamento da 
Terra (DUAT) system seems to have facilitated large-
scale land acquisition in Mozambique, as documented 
by UNAC and GRAIN. Land rights abuses are also 
reported in relation to forestry and mining concessions 
(ADECRU 2016; Maennling et al. 2014). Tanzania has 
a National Land Use Planning Commission and a Land 
and Infrastructure Task Force for demarcating and 
allocating village land for SAGCOT – rice and sugarcane 
schemes in particular. However, there are reports that 
procedures have been rushed and that village land-
use planning is concentrated in low-lying fertile areas, 
suggesting that their purpose is to make it easier for the 
land to be transferred to investors (Bergius 2016). These 
state bodies may work with, or come up against, elites 
and local authorities who take advantage of corridor 
developments to acquire land. In Kenya, for example, 
the National Land Commission is helping to ‘facilitate 
land acquisition’ for LAPSSET developments (LCDA 
2016: 10), leading to complaints (Kibugi et al. 2016; 
Kazungu 2015); but land speculation and disputes have 
also been fuelled by local business people and devolved 
land administrators at county level. Boone et al. (2016: 
46) comment that despite the hopes of improved land 
governance in Kenya after devolution, ‘community 
land remains a highly vulnerable target of large-scale 
resource grabbing’ – which is highly concerning, given 
that LAPSSET covers extensive areas of community 
and trust land (Elliott 2016; Repcon Associates 2017).
While this paper – and, indeed, international interest 
– has focused on the potential acquisition and 
transformation of farmland, the experience to date from 
LAPSSET in particular has highlighted that corridor 
development can stimulate land markets and threaten 
people’s resource tenure in other places, such as road-
side settlements or the urban outskirts of towns such 
as Lamu and Isiolo.
The risk of land rights abuses exists despite several of 
the donors involved requiring certain standards and 
due diligence to be followed (Synergia 2016; World 
Bank 2016a: 25). A critical question, then, is: how can 
corridor projects be introduced without endangering 
the access rights of people in rural and urban areas? 
Under what conditions are land rights respected, and 
what forms of land access will become important for 
accumulation and social differentiation in corridor 
regions?
6.2.2 ‘Focused on poor smallholders, but not   
 on the poorest’
The proponents of agricultural growth corridors – 
corporations, consultants, governments and donors 
– agree on certain things: the need for greater 
irrigation, a Green Revolution, production for export, 
and a continued place for large-scale farming. These 
ideas are deeply embedded in corridor blueprints and 
programmes, and are being implemented in the early 
years of the corridors. 
It can create incongruity and stakeholder tension 
when this vision of agriculture becomes incompatible 
with arguments – sometimes found in the same 
project documents – for smallholder empowerment, 
sustainable agriculture or import substitution (Byiers 
et al. 2016: 24). Nowhere is this incongruity and tension 
more evident than with the question of smallholders.
All of the corridors’ proponents use language of 
commercialisation and modernisation for their 
countries’ agricultural sectors, and promote the idea 
of needing to bring small-scale farmers or herders 
into globalised supply chains by transforming them 
from semi-subsistence to professionalism rather than 
supporting the farmers to flourish (as they would see it) 
outside the system. This often means targeting a certain 
type or class of farming household. The ProSAVANA 
leaflet states an aim to ‘promote and strengthen 
leading farmers’, for example, while the Beira blueprint 
did not include holdings under 5ha in its definition of 
smallholder. 
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There may be some beneficial effects for some rural 
residents from introduction of supportive outgrower 
schemes and projects like PROIRRI in Beira. However, 
programmes such as these, which require participating 
farmers to have a certain level of capital or collateral, risk 
excluding women and poor farmers with few assets. 
According to DFID’s annual review for 2014: 
The SAGCOT Centre is focused on poor 
smallholders, but not on the poorest. Typically 
the poorest farmers do not get priority treatment 
whereas the better off receive a large share of 
the benefits. This is principally for two reasons: 
the entrepreneurial few tend to rise to the top; 
and the drive by project implementing partners 
(IPs) to identify ‘early bird’ benefits and engage 
with ‘low hanging fruit’ – processes which do not 
normally engage the poorest farmers. By allowing 
the best performing smallholders to rise to the top, 
the focus on the broad mass of the very poorest 
could be subverted in the interests of meeting 
performance targets. (DFID 2015: 5)
This is the intrinsic risk of supporting programmes that 
explicitly set out to work with commercially minded 
smallholders and incorporate them into transnational 
supply chains rather than support farmers in staple food 
markets and local supply chains. Such programmes are 
often justified as endorsing the ‘stepping up’ rather than 
‘hanging in’ livelihood strategy described by Dorward 
et al. (2009) – but supporting a wider range of farmers, 
commodities and markets need not mean consigning 
those farmers to a life of barely getting by in semi-
subsistence. Commenting on corporate-led value chain 
initiatives, IFAD authors wrote in the Rural Development 
Report 2016 that: 
… governments should carefully assess the 
relative merits of investing in this powerful option 
for fewer small-scale farmers. Alternatively the 
government should look at other markets that 
may be less beneficial for each individual farmer, 
but have the potential to uplift many more family 
farms. (IFAD 2016: 240)
Understanding what inclusive agribusiness looks 
like to different interest groups and who is being 
excluded from opportunities created through corridor 
developments should be a priority task for any future 
studies.
6.2.3 Beyond production
A range of activities have been undertaken within the 
remit of the Nacala, Beira and SAGCOT corridors. 
With SAGCOT, the focus appears to have been on 
establishing outgrower schemes and large-scale 
farming operations, whereas Nacala and in particular 
Beira go beyond this to provide a wider range of 
support such as access to credit for farmers, training 
and a range of financing of upstream and downstream 
agribusiness SMEs (although note that cases of large-
scale agriculture and land-grabbing for that purpose are 
also documented for both Beira and Nacala). In general, 
there may need to be more activity in other areas to: 
support domestic processing firms; facilitate farmer 
organisations; and understand and support rural–urban 
markets, especially for staple food crops. Some of the 
grants or catalytic funding are reported to have gone 
to local processing enterprises, and their numbers and 
impacts may increase as the corridors develop.
It will be interesting to compare outcomes for farming 
and herding communities from those corridors with an 
explicit focus on agriculture, such as SAGCOT, to those 
for which agriculture is only a secondary concern, such 
as LAPSSET. To what extent does putting agricultural 
development at the centre of a corridor design, 
and including cluster development or research and 
extension services, ‘add value’ for farmers over 
simply providing hard and soft infrastructure from 
which farmers and local agribusiness can benefit? 
In the LAPSSET region, construction of road between 
Isiolo and Moyale in Kenya, and Moyale to Hawassa in 
Ethiopia, is already reported to have enhanced access to 
markets, cross-border trade and local investment (LCDA 
2016). During focus group discussions held in the area 
of Kambi ya Garba in Isiolo county, residents told Kibugi 
et al. (2016: 37) that ‘construction of the Isiolo Moyale 
Road had resulted in many positive developments, 
with enhanced transportation and market access for 
their livestock and other produce, increased value for 
their properties, and other opportunities’. There may be 
further efforts to exploit improved road infrastructure for 
benefit of livestock markets in LAPSSET areas. Similarly, 
in Tanzania, the CGIAR is reported to be working 
with smallholders in the groundnut and green bean 
markets to take advantage of SAGCOT infrastructural 
improvements (ECDPM 2015).
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A key question for future research will be: are corridors 
actually lowering the market barriers which economic 
analysts (e.g. Kuhlmann et al. 2011; Woodhill 2016) 
have argued to be hindering African producers from 
thriving?
6.2.4 Understanding the dynamics of poverty   
 and production
These observations lead to a final comment about the 
theory of how agricultural growth corridors will achieve 
positive change in rural economies. We accept that the 
range of motivations of actors may have led to ambiguity 
or deliberate ‘fuzziness’ in the documentation of corridor 
projects concerning their underlying objectives and the 
likely impacts on rural communities. Nevertheless (or 
perhaps because of this), when taken at surface value, 
it can appear that the logic of cause and effect has not 
been maintained consistently in the project design of 
corridors or the terms of engagement with investors.
For instance, the World Bank’s SAGCOT Investment 
Project targets activities that will improve links between 
productivity, service provision and market linkages, and 
is not clear if ‘agribusiness’ refers to domestic SMEs 
or transnational corporations. The ambiguity allows 
the corridors to subsidise supply chain initiatives of 
multinational input sellers and commodity buyers within 
the rubric of achieving ‘inclusive agribusiness’, ‘poverty 
alleviation’ and even reduction of food insecurity.
Food security and local food markets do not feature 
strongly in any of the corridor designs. Although the 
World Bank states that improving food security is one 
of the objectives of its SAGCOT Investment Project, it is 
unclear how exactly this will be achieved. As the World 
Bank explicitly allows for agribusiness projects in which 
produce will be exported, it may be assuming that 
food insecurity will be alleviated indirectly by increasing 
smallholder household incomes, although there will 
also be a contribution towards improving nutrition 
by ‘enhancing the competitiveness of smallholders 
in rice, maize and horticulture’. Agro-based clusters 
– a concentration of producers, traders and market 
institutions – tend to involve high-value, export-oriented 
commodities rather than staple crops for local markets 
(Gálvez-Nogales 2010). The importance of small-scale 
farming for domestic food production in Mozambique 
was a core message of civil society protests against 
ProSAVANA. Consequently, the revised ProSAVANA 
plan ‘went silent on private investment in export-
oriented large-scale commercial agriculture and 
emphasised support for small-scale farming and local 
markets instead’ (Cabral 2016: 123), while activities 
suggest that large-scale cultivation of soy for feed or 
export remains a core component of Nacala (Shankland 
and Gonçalves 2016). 
The World Bank position also highlights another issue: 
the proponents of corridors – particularly those donor 
and government actors which argue that the corridors 
will achieve sustainable development – are not clear on 
whether the problem faced by African smallholders is 
low productivity or weak market linkages. Let us again 
take SAGCOT as an example. SAGCOT as a whole 
is clearly framed by the designers’ assumption that 
smallholders must enter high-value, cross-border or 
international markets. Yet when it comes to the detail 
of where corridor activities will be concentrated, there 
is sometimes an unclear or confused rationale as to 
whether the focus should be on increasing farmers’ 
input usage and yields, improving transport and storage 
infrastructure, or ensuring smallholders’ access to 
markets. While for certain corporations the answer may 
be obvious, for the donors and governments that aim to 
reposition Yara’s original vision into an SDI, the objective 
and theory of change are not always clear.
This is important, not only for ensuring that corridor 
investment leads to truly inclusive agribusiness 
development, but also for ensuring sustainability of 
the corridor initiatives themselves. The experiences of 
Nacala and BAGC suggest that corridor designs that 
are incongruous with the interests of key stakeholders 
or farmers’ groups can create tension, which can lead 
to breakdown in administrative structures or the call 
to revise corridor blueprints. It is crucial that corridor 
planners articulate the causes of low productivity, 
poverty and food insecurity in rural areas and how 
these will be addressed. Policymakers must identify 
the obstacles to strengthening production and 
livelihoods for smallholders and poorer pastoralists, 
and critically assess the prospects for agricultural 
growth corridors or other corridors with an agricultural 
component to reduce those obstacles.
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ANNExE
Corridor Country	or	countries
Type	of	transport	
corridor
If	minerals	and/
or	agriculture	
mentioned
1. Southern Africa
North–South Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Botswana, Malawi, 
Mozambique (Moz), Republic 
of South Africa (RSA), Zambia, 
Zimbabwe
Railway
Maputo Moz, RSA Railway, road, 
port
Minerals 
(aluminium), gas, 
power
Lubombo Swaziland, Moz, RSA Railway, road
Limpopo Zimbabwe, RSA, Zambia, Moz Railway Proposed to be 
transformed into 
a development 
corridor
Beira Moz Railway, road Agriculture, mining
Zambezi Moz, Zimbabwe, Zambia Railway
Nacala Moz, Malawi, Zambia Railway Agriculture, mining
Walvis Bay 
(includes Trans-Kalahari, 
Trans Caprivi / Walvis 
Bay-Ndola-Lubumbashi, 
Trans Cunene, and Trans 
Oranje)
Namibia, Botswana, RSA Railway, road
Luanda Cabinda Angola Pipeline
Lobito Benguela Angola Railway
Namibe Angola Railway, road
Malanje / Malange Angola, DRC Railway, road
Coast-to-Coast Moz, Swaziland, RSA, 
Botswana, Namibia
Gauteng City Region RSA Urban
Manzini Durban RSA, Swaziland
Maseru-Durban RSA, Lesotho
Phalaborwa-Richards Bay RSA, Swaziland
Zambezi Valley Moz Railway Coal mining
Corridors in sub-Saharan Africa
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Corridor Country	or	countries
Type	of	transport	
corridor
If	minerals	and/
or	agriculture	
mentioned
2. East Africa
Mtwara Tanzania, Malawi, Moz, Zambia Railway Minerals (coal, 
iron ore, gas), 
agriculture, 
fisheries
Uhuru/Tazara Tanzania Railway
Central Tanzania, Rwanda Railway or road 
(unclear)
Gold
Tanga Tanzania Railway, road
Northern Kenya, Uganda, DRC Railway, road
LAPSSET Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan, 
(Uganda)
Railway, pipeline
Mombasa-Nairobi-Addis 
Ababa
Kenya, Ethiopia Road
Djibouti Djibouti, Ethiopia Railway
SAGCOT Agriculture
Central Tanzania, Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, 
Uganda
Kampala-Entebbe Uganda
3. West and Central Africa
Dakar-Port Harcourt Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Niger Railway
Conakry-Buchanan Guinea, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire Railway, pipeline
Sekondi-Ougadougou Ghana, Burkina Faso Railway
Gulf of Guinea ‘Coastal West Africa’ Coastal highway
Douala-N’djamena and 
Douala-Bangui
Cameroon, Central African 
Republic (CAR), Chad
Railway, road
Cameroon-Chad Chad, Cameroon Pipeline
Mbalam Cameroon, Congo Railway, road
Libreville-Lomie Gabon, Cameroon Railway, road
Bas Congo DRC Railway Hydropower, 
minerals
Abidjan-Ouagadougou Côte d’Ivoire
West African Rail Ring Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin, 
Togo, Côte d’Ivoire
Railway Minerals
Abidjan-Lagos
Dakar-Touba Senegal
Greater Ibadan Lagos 
Accra (GILA)
Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo Urban
Great Hausa Yoruba 
Ashanti City Triangle 
(GHAYA-CT)
Ghana, Benin, Togo, Nigeria
Emerging Luanda-
N’Djamena Corridor
Angola, DRC, Congo, Cameroon, 
Gabon, CAR, Chad
LAKAJI Nigeria Agriculture
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ENDNOTES
 1 Mozambique-Brazil-Japan Cooperation  
Programme for the Agricultural Development 
of the Savannah of Mozambique.
2 At the time, the established route was to use 
the Beira corridor due south to the   
port at Beira.
3 Population density calculated from area 
figures from www.statoids.com/umz. 
html and population numbers from World 
Bank Subnational Population Database  
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-
 catalog/subnational-population).
4 Population density calculated from area 
figures from www.statoids.
com/utz. html and population  
numbers fromWorld Bank Subnational  
Population Database (http://data.  
worldbank.org/data-catalog/subnational-
 population).
5 Population density calculated from area  
figures from www.statoids.com/ 
umz.html and populationnumbers   
from World Bank Subnational Population  
Database (http://data.worldbank.
org/data-catalog/subnational-population).
6 Big Results Now was disbanded in June 
2017.
7 Tanzania Sugarcane Growers Association, 
Agricultural Council of Tanzania,  
Tanzania Horticultural Association   
and Confederation of Tanzania Industries.
8 Such as the Nacala railway and port 
developments (Synergia 2016)  
www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/
Documents/Environmental-
 and-Social-Assessments/Mozambique_-_  
NACALA_RAIL___PORT_
PROJECT_-_Summary_
RAP_%E2%80%93_10_2015.pdf
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